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This paper investigates the role of bank lending in the monetary transmis-
sion process in the Netherlands. We observe signicant dierences between
the responses of corporate and household lending following a monetary shock.
We also nd that banks hold a buer stock of securities which they use to
oset monetary shocks. The main implication of our study is that a bank
lending channel is not likely to be an important transmission mechanism of
monetary policy.
1 Introduction
In recent years, a large body of literature has developed that emphasizes the role
of credit market imperfections in the monetary transmission process, known as the
`credit view' (see, for instance, Bernanke and Gertler [1995]). Part of this literature
focuses on the existence and the importance of a bank lending channel. According to
this transmission mechanism, banks respond to a monetary contraction by reducing
the supply of bank loans, which has a negative impact on real activity. The rele-
vance of a bank lending channel follows from the specic function of private banks
as nancial intermediaries, which is in contrast with their purely passive role in con-
ventional theory, as represented by e.g. the IS-LM model. A bank lending channel
operates on top of the standard interest rate channel. If part of the borrowers are bank
dependent|i.e. they cannot switch to alternative forms of external nancing|and
banks consider bank loans as imperfect substitutes for other assets on their balance
sheets, monetary policy may be eective through a bank lending channel.
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1Although the importance of nancial market imperfections in the monetary trans-
mission process|as predicted by the credit view|has been established by a large
number of studies, the empirical evidence for the existence of a bank lending channel
has been much less conclusive. To a large extent, this is due to the fact that most
studies based on aggregate data, following Bernanke and Blinder [1992], suer from a
severe identication problem: the inability to establish whether the decrease in credit
that is observed after a monetary contraction is induced by bank supply or driven by
a fall in borrowers' demand.1 In the latter case, a lending channel would be irrele-
vant. In this respect, recent studies based on disaggregate data are more informative.
The advantage of disaggregate data is that the response of credit variables can be
analyzed in combination with other hypotheses that follow from the theorical litera-
ture underlying the credit view. Information problems, for instance, are presumably
more relevant for particular categories of borrowers. Gertler and Gilchrist [1993,1994],
Oliner and Rudebusch [1996], and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek [1998] use quarterly panel
data of a large number of nonnancial rms in the US, taking heterogeneity among
borrowers into account. It appears from this research that, following a monetary
contraction, small rms reduce their amount of bank credit while large rms initially
attract more credit. Although this is obviously consistent with the credit view in
the sense that credit is `special', there is no general agreement to what extent these
ndings should be interpreted as support for a bank lending channel.2 Kashyap and
Stein [1997b] analyze quarterly data at the individual bank level. These authors nd
that monetary policy has in particular an impact on lending behaviour of relatively
small banks with less liquid balance sheets, which they interpret as support for a bank
lending channel.
Unfortunately, detailed time series at the individual rm or bank level are not
available for most countries. Empirical research may still yield valuable insights,
though, even if based on aggregate data. Garretsen and Swank [1998] observe that
a monetary contraction in the Netherlands is immediately followed by a substantial
reduction in banks' bond holdings, which they interpret as a buer stock that banks
use to shield their lending activity from monetary policy shocks. The subsequent
decrease in bank credit may possibly be attributed to demand eects, which suggests
that a bank lending channel is not important.
The purpose of this paper is to provide more evidence on the role of banks in
the transmission of monetary policy in the Netherlands, using vector autoregression
(VAR) analysis. We use bank balance sheet data on bank credit, split into loans to
the household sector and to the corporate sector. In this way, we separate dierent
classes of borrowers, although not as rigorous as in the aforementioned studies based
on US data. Our analysis is similar to Dale and Haldane [1995], who also distinguish
1See, for instance, Barran et al. [1996] for an analysis of nine European countries, Guender and
Moersch [1997] for Germany and Garretsen and Swank [1998] for the Netherlands.
2See Oliner and Rudebusch [1996] and Kashyap and Stein [1996] for a discussion.
2these two sectors in a study of monetary transmission in the UK. Our results show
that, especially for short-term credit, the sectoral dierences are striking. Firms react
to a negative monetary impulse by demanding more short-term credit, while total
credit to the household sector is reduced. This response of rms may be interpreted
as buer stock behaviour: following a monetary contraction, rms demand more
short-term loans to compensate for declining cash ﬂows. Furthermore, we nd strong
evidence consistent with the idea that banks use their bond holdings as a buer
against monetary shocks. The main implication of our results is that a bank lending
channel is not likely to be an important monetary transmission mechanism in the
Netherlands.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section oers a highly stylized model
that illustrates under what circumstances banks are likely to hold a large buer stock
of securities. Section 3 presents our results, based on VAR analysis. Section 4 con-
cludes.
2 Bank behaviour and buer stocks: a stylized model
The working of a bank lending channel, from a bank's perspective, can be illustrated
within a simple two-period framework, based on Kashyap and Stein [1995]. The
model presented here is limited in many respects: it is a partial equilibrium model
which only species the supply side of the credit market. Stein [1995] provides a more
rigorous microfoundation of a similar type of model, and suggests several extensions in
order to arrive at a complete macroeconomic model that species the entire monetary
transmission process. Developing a suchlike model is beyond the scope of this paper:
our only purpose is to capture the idea that banks may invest in a buer stock of
marketable securities which enables them to oset monetary shocks.




In the rst period, the bank has to specify an investment portfolio of two types
of assets: loans L and securities (`bonds') B. Loans are an attractive investment
because they yield a higher return than bonds, equal to r over both periods together,
which is exogenous to the bank. The return on bonds is normalized to zero, so r can
be interpreted as the spread between lending and investing in bonds. A disadvantage
of loans, however, is that they cannot be costlessly liquidated in period two. We
simply assume that liquidation costs are innite or, alternatively, that loans cannot
be liquidated. By contrast, bonds can be liquidated without any costs, which makes
them suited to serve as a buer stock.
3In order to nance its assets, the bank can use two types of liabilities. First,
the public holds demand deposits M with the bank, which are xed by the central
bank at M1 in period one and M2 in period two.3 In the rst period, the bank faces
uncertainty with respect to the amount of deposits in period two: given M1, M2 is
uniformly distributed on the interval [M1+(1−)M−γ;M1+(1−)M+γ], with
am e a no fM1 +( 1− )M,w h e r eM can be interpreted as an equilibrium value
of monetary stance. Hence,  can be seen as a measure of persistence of a monetary
policy disturbance in period one, and γ as a measure of its standard deviation. As
an alternative to demand deposits, a bank can raise non-deposit external nancing
N in both periods: these are N1 in period 1 and and N1 + N2 in period 2. Non-
deposit nance is characterized by increasing marginal costs, which we assume to be
equal to 1N2
1 and 2N2
2,w h e r e1; 2  0. The relevance of a convex increasing
cost function, which is essential for this model, can be explained by the fact that the
bank's creditors are likely to demand a higher return when external nance increases,
since they become exposed to higher risk. This does not hold for demand deposits,
which are protected by deposit insurance. The bank balance sheets in period one and
two, respectively, look as follows:
assets liabilities assets liabilities
L M1 L M2
B1 N1 B2 N1 + N2
Given these assumptions, it is easy to understand why banks are likely to invest in
a buer stock of liquid assets B in the rst period. In order to see this, consider the
situation in period two. There exist two possibilities. First, if N1 +M2 >L , the loan
portfolio can be nanced without any new external nance: N2 will be zero in this
case since it is always cheaper to reduce bond holdings (unless 2 = 0). Alternatively,
if N1 +M2 <L , the bank needs to attract new external nance: N2 = L−N1 −M2.
When the bank takes its portfolio decisions in period one, it has to take into account
that it cannot run the risk that loans have to be liquidated, and that M2 may become
M1 +( 1− )M − γ. Hence, if the bank comes in a situation that it needs to
raise non-deposit nance, i.e. N2 > 0, the expected costs of this external funding,
3This implies that monetary policy stance is measured by the volume of deposits, which is clearly
an oversimplication compared to actual policy practice. Nevertheless, we believe that the main
characteristics of the model in this section remain useful in a more realistic setting. Changes in
M that are analyzed in this model can be considered as monetary disturbances in general, rather
than just due to monetary policy. In most economies, the central bank is only able to control the
amount of base money: short-run changes in broad monetary aggregates are dominated by demand
or|particularly in the case of the Netherlands|reﬂecting international capital ﬂows. Moreover, the
monetary authorities use the short-term interest rate, rather than base money, as their main policy
target. Hence, as we focus on monetary policy shocks in this paper, we use a short-term interbank
interest rate as the policy variable in our estimations.





(L − N1 − M1 − (1 − )M + γ)2 (1)
The bank's portfolio choice of L and N1 in the rst period, and hence B,c a nb e








(L − N1 − M1 − (1 − )M
 + γ)
2 (2)













r + M1 +( 1− )M − γ (4)
B  M1 + N1 − L = −
3
22
r +( 1− )(M1 − M)+γ (5)
These three outcomes can be given an intuitive interpretation. According to Equa-
tion (3), the bank will raise non-deposit nance in the rst period up to the point
where the marginal costs of this funding are equal to the marginal return of lending:
21N1 = r. Second, Equation (4) shows that the supply of bank loans is a positive
function of its return r and the amount of deposits in the rst period and a negative
function of the variability of the money stock in the second period, indicated by γ.
Equation (5), nally, implies that banks will hold a large buer stock of bonds B if
there is a lot of uncertainty γ with respect to monetary stance|i.e. if the maximum
possible fall in deposits is large|while B further depends on the return r on loans
and the degree of persistence  of monetary disturbances.
The parameters 1 and 2 indicate the cost of non-deposit funding for a bank.
According to Kashyap and Stein [1995], these parameters are likely to be higher for
smaller banks, which implies according to (5) that smaller banks hold a larger buer
stock of securities B.I f1 and 2 are zero, this would imply that external funding is




2. Second, the variance of a variable that is uniformly distributed on the
interval [a;b]i se q u a lt o
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12 . Hence, our interval of [0;L− N1 − M1 − (1 − )M + γ] implies:
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Summation of these two expressions, and premultiplying by 2, yields Equation (1).
5costless: in that case, a bank would always be able to oset any unanticipated deposit
withdrawal, which makes a bank lending channel impotent.
What are the implications of this model for the Netherlands? Two aspects may
be relevant here. First, given the fact that large banks dominate the domestic credit
market and Dutch banks have high creditworthiness ratings, one would expect that
these banks can attract non-deposit funding at relatively low costs: in terms of the
model, 1 and 2 are likely to be low.5 This would reduce the impact of a bank
lending channel of monetary transmission.
Second, as a small, open economy with a xed exchange rate and a high degree of
capital mobility, the Netherlands are subject to external monetary shocks. Monetary
policy measures, which are in this paper summarized by innovations in the short-term
interest rate, are for the most part indirectly determined by the German Bundesbank.
Moreover, monetary aggregates have a relatively large foreign component due to the
impact of foreign capital ﬂows. Hence, monetary shocks are likely to have a high
variability which, according to (5), induces banks to hold a large buer stock of
bonds.
In sum, applying the model of this section to the Dutch situation suggests that
banks can relatively easily fund themselves with non-deposit nance while, in addition,
they may hold a large buer stock of marketable securities. Although these two
aspects are not independent|actually, the rst somewhat weakens the second because
of the low value of 2 in Equation (5)|one would ap r i o r iexpect that bank lending
is not an important transmission channel of monetary policy. Rather, the opposite
seems more plausible: by insulating their lending activity from monetary impulses,
banks may substantially reduce the real impact of monetary policy. This is consistent
with recent empirical research on bank behaviour. Swank [1994] concludes from an
interview study among Dutch banks that banks attach much value to bank-client
relationships, which implies that the credit market can be characterized as a customer
market, rather than an auction market. In addition, banks indicate that they are more
inclined to sell securities following a monetary contraction than to reduce loans supply.
3R e s u l t s
We analyze monthly and quarterly data over a sample that runs from March 1983
up to and including December 1996. The starting date coincides with the implicit
decision of the Dutch monetary authorities to x the guilder to the German Dmark.
Since 1983, the guilder-Dmark spot rate has been stable around a constant central
parity while the Dutch short-term interest rate has been virtually equal to its German
counterpart most of the time. Hence, we should interpret monetary policy, which is
5Kashyap and Stein [1997a] conclude, on the basis of these factors, that in the Netherlands banks
are better able to oset monetary disturbances than those in most other European countries.
6measured as innovations in the short-term interest rate, as being largely determined
by the German Bundesbank. We have not included the turbulent rst years of the
EMS period, during which the guilder was devaluated two times against the Dmark
while the short-term interest rate spread vis- a-vis Germany was relatively volatile, in
order to obtain a homogeneous period without shifts in policy regime.
In the rst subsection we brieﬂy discuss the data we used and report the results of
pre-testing. Next, we present our main empirical ndings, which consist of variance
decompositions and impulse-responses. We consider several VAR specications. First,
we present a VAR based on aggregate data. Since we include GDP as a measure of
aggregate activity, which is only available at a quarterly frequency, we have to use
quarterly data here. Subsequently, we analyze more disaggregate VAR models which
focus on the two sectors. As we use monthly series now, we can include more variables
while retaining sucient degrees of freedom.
3.1 Data and pre-testing
The data we use can be divided into three subsets:
 Bank balance sheet data. We include two bank assets, bond holdings and bank
loans. We take sectoral dierences into account by distinguishing a corporate
sector and a household sector. In our estimates based on monthly data, loans
are further disaggregated into short-term and long-term credit supplied to each
sector. The series we use are shown, at an annual frequency, in Figure 1.
It appears that, for both sectors, long-term credit has more than doubled
over our sample period, while short-term credit has shown a more modest
growth. Furthermore, the lion's share of short-term loans is supplied to rms,
while long-term credit is more equally distributed between both sectors. The
strong increase in long-term credit to households during the last two years of
our sample reﬂects a rising supply of mortgage loans due to a boom in the
housing market. Compared to total bank credit, the volume of bond holdings
is relatively modest, although the ratio bonds/total credit has increased over
our sample from 11% to about 20%. The volume of other securities, mainly
shares, is negligible. The only liability we include is a broad money aggregate
(M3). Most of M3 is in the hands of the household sector, but the main part
of this dierence consists of short-term saving deposits. Without short-term
savings, money holdings|M2, in fact|of both sectors are about the same.
 Key macroeconomic variables. We include real activity and prices, since these
are the main variables that reﬂect the ultimate eects of monetary policy. We
use GDP and the GDP deﬂator in our aggregate model, and corresponding
alternatives in our two sectoral specications (see data appendix). We also
include a real eective exchange rate, in order to account for the openness of
7s-t loans









































Figure 1: Bank balance sheet data (billions of guilders)
the Dutch economy. In our estimations based on monthly data, nally, we
include a long-term interest rate.
 Policy variable. Following Bernanke and Blinder [1992] and most of the sub-
sequent VAR-based literature on monetary policy transmission, we include a
three-month interest rate as our monetary policy variable. This is consistent
with the fact that this variable can be considered as the Dutch central bank's
main short-run target. As already mentioned, we should interpret this policy
variable as being largely indirectly determined by the German Bundesbank,
given the Dutch xed exchange rate policy vis- a-vis the Dmark.6
For all series, we performed augmented Dickey-Fuller tests in order to investigate
stationarity. The results are reported in Table 1. It can be concluded that all series
can be considered as I(1) variables, with the possible exception of long-term bank
6Garretsen and Swank [1998] go one step further by including the German short-term interest
rate as the policy variable.
8Series Levels First dierences
Trend Constant Trend Constant
lags  lags  lags  lags 
short-term interest 10 -1.65 10 -1.69 6 -3.55 6 -3.45
real eective exchange rate 6 -2.36 5 -1.38 1 -8.35 1 -8.34
gross domestic product 0 -2.75 1 -0.42 0 -9.26 0 -9.37
GDP deﬂator 4 -1.91 4 0.76 0 -8.71 3 -2.74
industrial production 9 -2.20 9 -1.19 8 -3.45 8 -3.43
producer price index 7 -2.59 5 -0.75 4 -4.12 4 -4.13
household expenditures 12 -2.76 12 0.50 11 -3.50 11 -3.42
household expenditures deﬂator 3 -1.54 3 0.33 2 -5.90 2 -5.83
M3 6 -1.32 6 -1.89 5 -3.75 5 -3.41
M3 corporate sector 3 -1.08 3 -2.06 2 -6.27 2 -5.97
M3 household sector 12 -1.63 12 -1.40 12 -4.27 12 -4.02
total loans 10 -2.63 7 0.69 2 -5.24 2 -4.98
short-term loans 12 -1.56 12 -0.85 11 -4.01 11 -4.02
long-term loans 9 -3.16 10 0.23 3 -3.34 5 -2.26
total loans corporate sector 12 -2.03 12 -0.36 4 -4.09 4 -4.12
s-t loans corporate sector 12 -1.47 12 -1.05 11 -3.96 11 -3.97
l-t loans corporate sector 5 -3.06 5 -0.45 12 -3.03 12 -3.24
total loans household sector 6 -1.41 6 0.81 2 -4.47 2 -3.92
s-t loans household sector 6 -2.16 7 -0.41 6 -4.71 7 -4.72
l-t loans household sector 6 -1.22 6 0.95 3 -3.08 3 -2.61
banks' bond holdings 10 -2.27 10 -1.18 5 -2.89 5 -2.99
Test statistics; all variables are in real terms (except interest rates and price indices) and in logs
(except interest rates). All specications include a constant term and up to twelve lags, except for
GDP and the GDP deﬂator where a maximum of four lags have been included; , and  denote
rejection of nonstationarity at the 10%, 5% and 1% signicance level, respectively, based on critical
values computed by MacKinnon [1991] .
Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
9model # variables cointegration rank
Figure 3: aggregate model 7 6
Figure 4: corporate sector 7 6
Figure 4: household sector 7 6
Figure 5: corporate sector 10 9
Figure 5: household sector 10 8
Table 2: Cointegration
loans, although the evidence in some cases depends on the specication (including a
trend or not). It may seem somewhat strange to nd that prices are I(1), whereas in
many studies these are found to be I(2), but this may be attributed to the fact that
inﬂation has been relatively low, even sometimes negative, in our sample period.
Akaike's Information Criterion and a Likelihood Ratio test have been carried out
to determine the optimal number of lags. Since these tests led to very dierent
outcomes, we simply impose four lags in the case of quarterly data and twelve lags in
the case of monthly data. In the latter case, we reduced the number of parameters
to be estimated by imposing a lag structure of f1,2,3,6,9,12g, in order to conserve
degrees of freedom. Our results are robust to slightly dierent lag structures
We applied the Johansen [1991] procedure to investigate cointegration, using the
Pantula principle to jointly determine the cointegration rank and the specication of
the cointegration space. Table 2 reports, for each VAR specication of Section 3.2,
the number of cointegration relationships. Since cointegration can be established in
all cases, while the cointegration rank is close to the number of variables included, we
estimate our models as unrestricted VARs in which each variable is included in levels.
Our results are based on innovations analysis (impulse-response analysis and vari-
ance decompositions) which can be performed with an estimated VAR model, trans-
formed into its moving average representation. Each time, we use a simulation period
of three years (i.e. 12 quarters or 36 months). Innovations are identied by imposing a
Wold causal chain in which the policy variable is ordered rst, and the other variables
in the order presented in the impulse-response graphs. By ordering the short-term
interest rate rst we capture the idea that it is the `least endogenous' variable, which
reﬂects both the fact that it is largely determined indirectly by German policymakers,
and the fact that in reality information on prices and real activity are available with
a lag of at least a month. We also investigated alternative orderings, but these hardly


















































The graphs indicate for each variable the part of the forecast error variance that can be attributed,
from top to bottom, to bond holdings, bank loans, money, the eective exchange rate, real activity,
the price level and the short-term interest rate.
Figure 2: Aggregate model: variance decompositions (quarterly data)
3.2 Innovation analysis
We rst analyze a VAR that consists of only aggregate data, including the short-
term interest rate, price level, GDP, eective exchange rate, money (M3), total bank
loans and banks' bond holdings. All variables are in real terms (except the short-
term interest rate and prices) and in logs (except the short-term interest rate). We
also experimented with VAR systems that include German variables (real activity
and prices), following Garretsen and Swank [1998], in order to obtain a better mean-
reversion of the short-term interest rate. Since this hardly aect our results, we
decided to leave them out, in order to conserve degrees of freedom.
Figure 2 presents a forecast error variance decomposition for each variable. It
appears that short-term interest rate innovations, indicated by the black part of each
bar, immediately have a substantial eect on banks' bond holdings, while the impact
on the other variables is very limited in the rst simulation periods. Apparently,
bonds are very sensitive to monetary policy shocks. This is conrmed by Figure 3,
which plots the dynamic response of each variable following an unanticipated mon-
etary contraction.7 These ndings corroborate the results of Garretsen and Swank




































































Figure 3: Aggregate model: impulse-responses (quarterly data)
[1998], even though their specication and estimation period are slightly dierent.
After the initial shock of about 25 basis points, the policy variable returns to a level
not signicantly dierent from zero within two quarters. Real activity, money and
bank loans show a negative reaction, which is consistent with the interpretation of a
monetary tightening, although the responses are not immediately signicant. Prices
do not seem to respond at all, which suggests that nominal rigidities are important.
The real eective exchange rate appreciates, and returns to its base level after a year.
Banks' bond holdings, nally, show an immediate and highly signicant negative re-
sponse. Furthermore, looking only at the point estimates, it appears that the response
of bond holdings is about four times as large as the responses of loans and money.
Together with the evidence of the variance decomposition in Figure 2, this can be
interpreted as strong evidence that banks, rather than to adjust their loans portfolio,
prefer to use their bond holdings as a buer stock to oset monetary shocks.
The next relevant question is how to explain the subsequent decrease in bank
loans, which becomes signicant after a year. Given our observation that the most
important reaction of banks after a monetary tightening is to adjust bond holdings,
the response of bank loans is likely to be the result of a decrease in demand. In
this respect, it is worth to notice that the decrease in aggregate bank loans coincides
with the fall in real activity, which also becomes more or less signicant after a year.
Doan [1995]), based on 100 draws.
12From the bank's perspective, and consistent with our theoretical framework in Section
2, the response of credit may be attributed to the fact that existing loan contracts
cannot be liquidated, or at a high cost. Hence, banks can only reduce the supply
of new loans, which presumably does not immediately lead to a substantial fall in
aggregate loans. Of course, this holds in particular for the banks' response to a
monetary contraction. It should be noticed, though, that our analysis is symmetric
with respect to the direction of monetary policy measures, which implies that banks'
response to a monetary expansion mirrors the results presented here.8
A disaggregation of total bank loans into corporate lending and household lend-
ing, however, suggests that the insignicant response of aggregate lending in the rst
quarters is the net result of signicant responses of these two dierent types of bor-
rowers in opposite directions (see Figure 4). This may be explained by what is known
as the `ﬂight to quality' hypothesis (Bernanke et al. [1994]). Two basic ingredients of
this hypothesis are (1) heterogeneity among borrowers and (2) increasing demand for
short-term credit following a monetary tightening, to compensate for declining cash
ﬂows. Since only high quality borrowers will be able to obtain additional credit, while
loans supplied to low quality borrowers is reduced, there will be a shift in the quality
mix of bank loans. Insofar as our distinction between rms and households matches
the dierence between high and low quality borrowers, this is consistent with our re-
sults. It seems plausible that information asymmetries between banks and households
may be greater than between banks and rms or, alternatively, that households are
more like small rms in this respect. The latter would be consistent with the nd-
ings of Gertler and Gilchrist [1993], who consider the responses of lending to dierent
types of rms as well as households in the US, and conclude that the responses of
bank lending to households and small rms following a monetary policy shock are
very similar. Like bank loans, M3 shows a dierent response for both sectors, albeit
less pronounced. To some extent, this follows directly from the balance sheet identity
which implies that money and credit are positively correlated for each sector. The fact
that most of M3 is in the hands of households explains that aggregate M3 eventually
shows a negative response.
Figure 5 plots impulse-responses of more detailed VAR specications for each
sector. We use monthly data now, which allows us to include more variables. Again,
we looked at systems in which we included German variables as well, but this hardly
inﬂuenced our results, so we left them out. In addition to the variables in Figures 3
and 4, we also include the long-term interest rate and we split bank loans for each
sector into long-term and short-term credit. In order to take the interdependence
between the two sectors into account, we include industrial production as well as
household expenditures in both sectoral VARs.
8Using a very dierent methodology and sample, Van Ees et al. [1998a] nd some evidence for








































































The rst column is copied from Figure 3. The second and third columns plot the responses of similar
VARs for the corporate sector and the household sector, in which prices, activity, money and loans
are replaced by the corresponding variables of these sectors (see appendix).
Figure 4: Disaggregate data: responses of money and credit (quarterly data)
In both models, the long-term interest rate follows the same pattern as the short-
term rate, although its initial response is much smaller. Variance decompositions,
which are not reported, show that innovations in the long-term interest have a marked
impact on the corporate sector variables, while the inﬂuence on household sector
variables is negligible, which implies that the open capital market is a relevant factor
only for rms.
Prices show initially a positive response, which is in contradiction with the ex-
pected result of a monetary contraction, and also with our aggregate model in which
prices did not react at all. This perverse response of prices shows up in many VAR-
based studies and may be an indication that an important variable is omitted. In-
cluding the oil price or a commodity price index, as Sims [1992] suggests, in order
to take supply eects into account, did not resolve this price puzzle. Dale and Hal-
dane [1995] suggest that the positive response of prices after a monetary tightening
may be explained by increasing variable costs which initially translate into higher
prices due to cost mark-up pricing. Whereas the decrease in the real activity measure
for our corporate model|industrial production|becomes borderline-signicant after
more than a year, which is in line with the response of GDP in Figure 3, household
expenditures do not seem to respond at all. Apparently, the eventual real eects






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Impulse-responses per sector (monthly data)
15receiver of interest payments in the Netherlands (see, for instance, BIS [1995], p.
19) may be responsible for the absence of real eects in the household sector. The
corporate sector, by contrast, is a net payer of interest.
The bank balance sheet variables show striking dierences between both sectors.
First, with respect to long-term loans, the corporate sector does not respond, while
loans to households initially fall; the subsequent rise of the latter is insignicant. The
results for short-term credit are also quite dierent: in this case, rms respond by in-
creasing their volume of loans, while the response of households is insignicant, which
is in line with the `ﬂight to quality' hypothesis. The explanation of this result may be
that declining cash ﬂows induce rms to demand short-term credit. The latter is less
relevant for households, who hold only a small part of short-term loans (see Figure 1).
The net result is consistent with our earlier observation that during a year after the
monetary impulse aggregate credit does not respond signicantly, which masks the
fact that the loans portfolio of the banking sector shows a shift from households to the
corporate sector. Second, money holdings also show a dierent result for both sectors.
For rms, there is no signicant response, which implies that they prefer to attract
short-term credit rather than to reduce their money holdings. For households, there
is a short, negative response. Again, it can be noticed that, according to the balance
sheet restriction, bank lending should to some extent mirror money holdings for each
sector. The response of rms following a monetary contraction may be interpreted
as buer stock behaviour, which is consistent with the conclusions of De Haan et al.
[1992,1994]. Finally, banks' bond holdings show a clear negative response, which is
consistent with our earlier observation that bonds are used as a buer stock against
monetary shocks.
In general, we can conclude that, although banks play a relevant role in the trans-
mission process, bank lending is not likely to be important as a transmission channel
of monetary policy. For the corporate sector, short-run credit supply increases after a
monetary contraction, which implies that monetary shocks are, at least partly, oset.
The fact that we observe a negative, although not very signicant, response of real
activity implies that monetary policy may operate through the standard interest rate
channel. For households, the story is slightly dierent. We do observe a fall in bank
lending following a monetary contraction, but this does not lead to a decrease in real
expenditures. Hence, although there may be some scope for a bank lending channel
here, it is presumably not an important transmission mechanism.
We performed several robustness checks. We repeated the analysis for a shorter
sample, up to 1994, since the last years have seen a large credit expansion in the
housing market in combination with easy monetary policy, which may be largely
responsible for the observed negative relationship between monetary stance and long-
term personal credit. This hardly changed the results, however, and did not aect
our conclusions. Further, we experimented with alternative variables. We replaced
16M3 by M2 and included several components of consumer expenditures instead of
aggregate consumer expenditures. As we reported earlier, we also looked at speci-
cations in which we included German variables in order to obtain a better mean
reversion mechanism of the policy variable. Neither of these alternative specications
had much impact on our results. Finally, we included the German short-term interest
rate, rather than its Dutch counterpart, as the policy variable, following Garretsen
and Swank [1998]. In this case, we found a signicant positive response of long-term
credit to the corporate sector, instead of no response. However, this does not aect
our overall conclusions; it rather strengthens the `ﬂight to quality' interpretation of
our results.
3.3 Related literature
Our ndings extend the analysis of Garretsen and Swank [1998], which is based on
purely aggregate data, by taking dierences between types of borrowers into account.9
Their results can be replicated in a richer setting. Our sectoral approach follows Dale
and Haldane [1995] who perform a comparable analysis for the UK. These authors nd
similar dierences in responses of rms and households, but do not address buer stock
behaviour of banks. Further, in contrast to our results, they nd signicant responses
of real activity following a monetary shock, for both sectors as well as GDP.
Our results can be interpreted along the lines of a number of studies on the US (e.g.
Gertler and Gilchrist [1993,1994], Oliner and Rudebusch [1996]). The conclusions of
these studies are probably more robust than ours since they are based on large sets
of individual rm data, whereas we employ a relatively crude distinction between
two sectors. Van Ees et al. [1998] investigate nancial constraints using a panel of
Dutch rm level data, and conclude that these are in particular relevant for certain
types of rms, which suggests that a more disaggregated approach may be useful. A
possible shortcoming of most of these microbased studies, however, is that they focus
on rms while, at least in the Netherlands, a substantial part of credit is supplied to
households.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the role of bank behaviour in the transmission of
unanticipated monetary policy shocks in the Netherlands. Using VAR analysis, we
investigated aggregate eects as well as possible dierences between sectors. An
important conclusion, which has also been found by Garretsen and Swank [1998],
is that banks use their bond holdings as a buer stock to oset monetary impulses.
Credit aggregates show a positive response of short-term loans to the corporate sector,
9Similar studies on the Netherlands, based on aggregate data, are Kroes [1996], Smant [1997] and
Van Ees et al. [1998].
17while long-term credit to households falls. To the extent that rms can be considered
as high quality borrowers and households as low quality borrowers, this result is
consistent with the `ﬂight to quality' hypothesis, which predicts a shift in the quality
mix of banks' loan portfolio. The main implication of our ndings is that monetary
policy in the Netherlands does not work via a bank lending channel, which is consistent
with our ap r i o r iexpectations based on a stylized model of bank behaviour. On the
contrary: rather than providing an important transmission channel, banks in the
Netherlands are more likely to reduce the macroeconomic impact of monetary policy,
by insulating their lending activity from monetary shocks. This may partly explain
why we hardly nd signicant real eects of monetary disturbances.
It may be interesting to estimate richer specications of the banking sector's bal-
ance sheet, for instance by including banks' non-deposit funding in the analysis. Like
bond holdings, banks may use this instrument to oset monetary policy shocks. Ac-
cording to Swank [1994], banks indicate that they will indeed try to attract domestic
long-term liabilities following a monetary contraction. Another extension may be to
investigate dierences between several types of banks, in the spirit of Kashyap and
Stein [1997b]. Finally, it would be useful to investigate more explicitly to what ex-
tent the Dutch credit market is demand-determined, which is an implication of our
ndings that is not directly tested.
A Data appendix
All our data are seasonally adjusted except interest rates and the eective exchange
rate. Most of the series are taken from the source in seasonally adjusted form, some
have been seasonally adjusted by ourself.
 Bank balance sheet variables. Source: Dutch central bank (DNB). M3 and
bank credit have been disaggregated for rms and households: the sectoral
models include the corresponding component of that sector. All series have
been corrected for breaks.
 Real activity, prices. For the aggregate model, we include real GDP as a mea-
sure of real activity, and the implicit GDP deﬂator as the price index. Both
are taken from the IFS database. For the corporate sector, we use indus-
trial production and the producer price index from the IFS. For the household
sector, we use the volume of total household expenditures and its correspond-
ing deﬂator, both taken from Datastream and seasonally corrected with the
Census X-11 adjustment routine. In order to compare the magnitude of the
responses of these variables among the models, we normalized all activity and
price indices by dividing them by their 1990:01 observation.
18 Exchange rate, interest rates. In each model, we include the real eective
exchange rate, based on unit labour costs, taken from the IFS database. An
increase in this variable reﬂects an appreciation of the Dutch guilder. The
short-term interest rate is the three month interbank rate, and the long-term
interest rate is the government bond yield, taken from the IFS.
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